Published by the CIPS Network of the National Association of REALTORS®
Third Quarter 2008
China Watch: Reflections on Democracy Building
By Gordon Davis
The March confrontations in Tibet, and the events
surrounding them, have caused me to ponder.
Having a great affection for China, a country with
which I’ve been involved for more than 20 years,I’m optimistic
about political progress toward democratic
reform, although it’s glacially slow. Recognizing that it is
debatable whether democracy-building programs sponsored
by the West are appropriate for China,for me,the
answer hinges on three interdependent issues.
The normative issue:
Is there progress toward democracy?
How democratic is China? How much progress has it
made on its purported initiative for democratic reform?
Where is it heading? Reviewing some of the available
material referenced below, one might ask what kind of
Chinese democracy is realistic and, if it materializes, will
it be an improvement?
Recently, columnist David Brooks wrote in The New York
Times about the false sightings of democracy in Iraq,1 referencing the “belief that peace will come to [Iraq] when
the nation’s political elites gather at a convention hall and
make a series of grand compromises involving power-
sharing and a new constitution.” He calls this “Founding
Fatherism,” arguing that this sort of democracy will
never come to Iraq because it is not “living in the
shadow of the Magna Carta.” If we’re defining democracy
that way, he says, we’ll never find it in Iraq, a society in
which, “political progress takes different forms. It’s not
top down. It’s bottom up. And this is exactly the sort of
progress we are seeing in Iraq.” He says “[t]here has been
political progress.It just doesn’t look the way we expected
it to.”Whether we agree on Iraq,his reasoning applies
to China as well.
From the U.S. perspective, “democracy” means human
rights protections, the rule of law, an independent judiciary,
and direct elections of all political leaders through
universal suffrage. Chinese leadership, which uses the
term constantly, interprets it differently. According to
John Thornton,the chairman of the Board of Trustees at
the Brookings Institution, now teaching at Tsinghua
University, Chinese leadership construes democracy
to mean expanding citizen inputs to government decision-
making and encouraging more robust intraparty
policy discussion, while preserving strict Party control.
Although it sees a role for elections, particularly at the
local level, it asserts that, for China, a “deliberative” form
of politics allowing individual citizens and groups to add
their views to the decision-making process is more
appropriate than open, multiparty competition for
national power. It often mentions meritocracy, including
the use of examinations, to test a candidate’s competence
for office, reflecting the Chinese belief that the
government should be composed of the country’s most
talented.The current leaders do not welcome the latitude
of freedom of speech, press, or assembly taken for
granted in the West, but support the orderly expansion
of these rights focusing on the collective, and social
harmony—what they consider the common good.2
Thornton refers to this as “guided democracy” and admits
he doesn’t know whether this is where China’s political
evolution will end or whether it will continue to evolve
toward liberal democracy as practiced in the West.
Critics like James Mann interpret the situation more
dourly, and would frustrate expectations of a democratic
China.3 Others like Shi Tianjian of Duke would agree
that “democracy” means something different in China
than in the U.S. He differentiates “procedural democracy”
from “substantive democracy.” Procedural democracy,
corresponding to Western liberal democracy,
“determines the legitimacy of state governments based
on democratic procedures such as election, lobbying,
etc.” Substantive democracy is “based on how well
policies from the governments reflect the interests of the
public.” According to Shi, most Chinese prefer
“substantive democracy,” with such niceties as human
rights protections and elections taking second place to
economic concerns and social stability.If Shi is correct,it
doesn’t bode well for universal suffrage.4
My own impression is that, as long as the economic
miracle continues, a big slice of the Chinese population
is pretty satisfied with a system that suppresses
human rights and rejects direct election of leaders.
I had that impression long before reading former
Time Magazine Beijing Bureau Chief Matthew Forney’s
insightful piece in The New York Times.5
He says that, unfortunately,educated young Chinese who ought to be
“the best positioned to bridge cultures,” are the most
“patriotic,establishment-supporting people.”The young,
at least for now, are giving their unquestioning support
to the Communist Party of China (CPC) on such issues
as Tibet.
Of course, the nationalism of young Chinese may soften
over time. As college graduates enter the work force
and experience reality,they often grow more critical.It is
received wisdom in China that people in their 40s are
most willing to challenge the government. The Tibet
crisis bears this out—in May, 29 ethnic Chinese intellectuals
signed a widely publicized petition urging the
government to show restraint in the crackdown. Not
one was under 30.
Liu Yawei, the head of The Carter Center China
Program,6 is optimistic. His thinks
public pressure has prompted a change in government attitudes.
“Government officials and some scholars, although still staunchly
resistant to meaningful political reform,have come to see
that universal practices such as elections, decision by
votes, access to information, accountability, and rule of
law are an integral part of any government that seeks to
protect its legitimacy and sustain its rule of the people.
The pressure from the bottom,slow but real perceptional
changes, and adoption of laws and regulations that
insure citizens right to know, to speak freely, and to participate
in politics, will eventually coalesce into a huge force that may quicken China’s steps toward a more democratic and open government.”7
Liu’s view that rising public pressure for reform produces
results is a thread running through many recent China
opinion pieces. In his book, “China’s Democratic Future:
How It Will Happen and Where It Will Lead,” Bruce Gilley
predicted these influences would bring China to a major
political discontinuity within ten years, leading to the
Party’s withdrawal from the scene and the institution of
a new, democratic government.This strikes me as a fantasy.
But clearly, liberalization of property rights and
growing affluence has created a middle class stake in the
rule of law, particularly in procedural fairness.
Even so, it’s unclear what path reform will take and what
democracy in China will ultimately look like. In 2005, the
CPC published a white paper on the development of
“Socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics.”8
It made clear that reforms would take place under one
party, and would advance gradually, in incremental steps,
with details dependent upon the unique Chinese tradition
and culture, claiming to have incorporated “multiparty
consultations” into its system of governance. In
2007, it published a white paper on the role of political
parties in China, describing a “multi-party consultative
system” professing to be a kind of network, functioning
through conferences, seminars, and policy proposals initiated
by the parties, for aggregating opinions and ideas.9
Other elements of “consultative democracy” are being
rolled out,none of which add up to liberal democracy as
defined by the West. Although the Chinese miss no
opportunity to dash hopes that China will soon become
a Western liberal democracy, this strengthens the
impression that the CPC does want to expand public
input and increase transparency and accountability.
It is widely assumed that Hong Kong is a bellwether for
Chinese democracy. Would it be a step forward,if China
adopted a system of open nominations and direct elections
for national legislators and government officials—
even with some kind of filtering mechanism that reserves
to the Party the capability of striking candidates—a procedure
Beijing seems to be pushing for electing Hong
Kong’s Chief Executive?
Referring back to Brooks,whether we recognize China’s
evolving system as democracy may depend on what we
expect to see—how rigidly we define the term—and
how long we are willing to wait.
The timing issue: What is a justifiable
timeline for democratic reform?
In a recent Council on Foreign Relations online
Backgrounder, “China’s Slow Road to Democracy,”10
author Carin Zissis summed up some of the timing predictions
for democratization in China like this:“Experts
say,given the Communist Party’s power,democracy does
not appear to be a short-term possibility.” And CFR’s
Jerome Cohen says “Prospects for an organized challenge
to the party or significant mass protests are very
dim,”11 because of the government’s expertise at dividing
the opposition.
Last year, in Foreign Affairs magazine, Professor Azar Gat
argued that authoritarian capitalist powers such as China
and Russia “may represent a viable alternative path to
modernity, which in turn suggests that there is nothing
inevitable about the liberal democracy’s ultimate victory—
or future dominance.”12 Political scientist Francis
Fukuyama, who famously predicted the evolution of all
states toward Western-style democracies in his 1989
essay “The End of History,”13
recently told the International Herald Tribune the time frame for China turning democratic “has to be a lot longer.” In the next few decades,he said,
“...the authoritarian system will keep getting stronger and
stronger.”
Despite such dire predictions, there is objective evidence
of progress in China.Village committees and leaders have
been popularly elected since 1988,and people’s congresses
in towns and counties have been directly elected since
the 1990s. Now, even provincial and national people’s
congresses hold elections with more candidates than
open positions—there are some losers. The CPC is
experimenting with elections, although a 2005 promise
that town leaders would be directly elected “in a couple
of years” has not yet ensued. An estimated 80 percent of
Mainland Chinese now vote on tens of thousands of
candidates for local offices,and many see the “consultative
democracy” mechanisms described above as serious
efforts to open up the process.
The West wants China to adopt a much shorter time-
line for democratic reform. We look for straws in the
wind signaling imminent change.When we get temporizing
followed by the occasional cautious step forward,
we’re disappointed.But I wonder if we’re being realistic.In
his new book,“Big Ideas for a New President,”14
Edward Mortimer quotes Brookings Institution President Strobe
Talbott: “[In Europe,] the establishment of a judiciary, the
rule of law, equitable taxation, parliamentary representation,
and the other necessities for democracy all came
slowly and painfully. This was a lesson of history that I
tried,not always as vividly as I should have,to keep in mind
when I was involved at the State Department during the
1990s in ventures known,simplistically, as ‘nation-building’
and ‘democracy-promotion.’ These terms, bursting with
can-do Yankee optimism,are deceptive since they refer to
things that have, in Western history, taken decades to
begin and centuries to accomplish.”15
One way to look at the local elections is as a remarkable
decision by Chinese leadership to provide a giant
training ground for millions of Chinese in election politics
and democracy. Given China’s fear of chaos—justified by
its history—and its lack of democratic experience, it’s
hard to say that a training period, even decades long, is
unreasonable.
The part of China where democracy building is moving
the fastest is Hong Kong, where The Basic Law, negotiated
by the British before releasing it back to China in
1997, provides that universal suffrage will be adopted for
the selection of its Chief Executive and Legislative
Council. No timetable is specified, except this is to take
place in a “gradual and orderly” fashion—interpreted by
the Chinese as a painstakingly slow pace.
You might say Hong Kong is serving as a kind of dress
rehearsal for “democracy with Chinese characteristics,”
making its democratic development important not just to
its seven million citizens, but as a model for mainland
cities—over a hundred of which have a population over
one million.The CPC has repeatedly said that these cities
must develop mechanisms for greater citizen input into
policy and administration. Three reasons for this are
apparent:a publicly stated one (China is democratizing);a
not-so-publicly-admitted one (citizen participation is the
best way to suppress corruption); and an obvious one
(the rising middle class is demanding it).
Beijing drags its feet on democratization in Hong Kong,in
part because it fears it won’t get it right—producing an
unacceptable model Mainland cities will rush to adopt.A
recent decision by the National People’s Congress to
postpone direct election of Hong Kong’s Chief Executive
until 2017 is a useful barometer in predicting Beijing’s
timetable for reform in Mainland cities and the central
government. Nothing significant seems likely for at least
a decade.
The facilitative issue: Can the West really
promote democracy in China?
If you can see promise for democracy in the puzzling
mosaic of evidence concerning China’s reform intentions,
and if you can tolerate a timeline that may be several
decades long, you’ll agree that Western supported
democracy-building can be important and useful to
China. I believe that even modest reforms are worth
supporting if they broaden the base of citizen inputs to
government decision-making, despite the continued
domination of the CPC. Chinese politics are opaque,
often ugly, and maddeningly difficult to read, but something
is going on here. There are Chinese institutions and
individuals willing to promote citizen participation,
employ the advocacy potential of NGOs, and experiment
with democratic governance models in a variety
of unexpected niches within both the public and private
sectors.The political climate changes from day to day,and
is not always propitious,but promising outcomes can and
often do arise from cooperative efforts.
So—can Western democracy building programs succeed
in China? Yes,if we adopt the long view,and if we accept
the fact that democracy with Chinese characteristics
probably won’t look the way we expect it to—at least in
the short run.Such programs provide important support
to China’s reformers.The key reformers are mid-level,
mid-career officials in their forties and fifties quietly
struggling with corruption, inefficiencies, and abuses.
Most already have excellent ideas on how to improve the
system to make it more transparent and accountable.
Our support provides them with platforms and
resources to implement their ideas. If we season our
presence in China with patience, flexibility, humility, and
a sense of humor, important results are possible. gp
by Gordon Davis
Gordon Davis was China Resident Director for the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (www.ndi.org/), living in Hong Kong, until July 2008.
He was responsible for NDI’s Mainland China program and supervised its Hong Kong program. He expresses his personal views here, which are not necessarily those of NDI.
1.www.nytimes.com/2008/04/08/opinion/08brooks.html?scp=1&sq=brooks+david+iraq&st=nyt
2. www.foreignaffairs.org/20080101faes-say87101/john-l-thornton/long-time-coming.html
3. www.foreignpolicy.com/story/ cms.php?story_id=3837
4. www.carnegieendowment.org/events/ index.cfm?fa=print&id=1080
5. www.nytimes.com/2008/04/13/opinion/13forney.html
6. www.cartercenter.org/peace/china_elections/index.html
7.www.carnegieendowment.org/events/ index.cfm?fa=print&id=1080
8. www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-10/19/ content_486206.htm
9. www.china.org.cn/english/news/231852.htm
10. www.cfr.org/publication/13616/
11. www.cfr.org/publication/15037/
12.www.foreignaffairs.org/20070701faessay86405/azar-gat/the-return-of-authoritarian-great-powers.html
13. www.wesjones.com/eoh.htm
14. www.nybooks.com/articles/article-preview?article_id=21252
15.www.cfr.org/publication/15506/great_experiment.html
More articles >>
|
