Article 11 (excerpt): REALTORS® shall not undertake to provide specialized professional services concerning a type of property or service that is outside their field of competence unless they engage the assistance of one who is competent on such types of property or service, or unless the facts are fully disclosed to the client. Any persons engaged to provide such assistance shall be so identified to the client and their contribution to the assignment should be set forth.
Leo v. Neill: Alabama Supreme Court Holds That Purchasers Must Prove Reasonable Reliance to Recover Damages for MLS Errors and/or Fraud
In Leo v. Neill, the Supreme Court of Alabama addressed the issue of reliance in the context of MLS errors. The court concluded that where purchasers do not reasonably rely on MLS information, they may not recover damages, even though the information is actually in error.
In Jorgensen Realty, Inc. v. Box, Jorgensen Realty appealed an order confirming a Board arbitration award. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed that the Board had legally arbitrated an inter-member dispute.
In Farnsworth Samuel Limited v. Grant, the Court of Appeal of Louisiana addressed the issue of procuring cause in the sale of property. The court found that although the sale occurred outside of the listing agreement and extension periods, because broker initially introduced the buyer to the property and assisted in the original bid, which differed from the final bid by an amount nearly equal to the commission, broker was procuring cause of the sale.
Cultom v. Heritage House Realtors: Washington Supreme Court Finds Broker Not Engaged in Unauthorized Practice of Law Upon Completing Pre-Printed Earnest Money Agreement
In 1985, the Supreme Court of Washington held that a real estate agent does not commit the unauthorized practice of law by completing a pre-printed earnest money agreement, provided the transaction is simple and the form was drafted by an attorney. The court held that in drafting such agreements and their addenda, an agent is held to the standard of care of a practicing attorney. Because the agent failed to follow the instructions of the client, she was held liable for damages and interest.
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center: Supreme Court Uses Equal Protection to Stop Discrimination Against Handicapped Persons
Prior to the enactment of the Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988 adding handicapped to the protected classes, the Supreme Court addressed the applicable standard of review for alleged Equal Protection clause violations against mentally retarded people in the case City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center. The Court held that a city ordinance violated the Equal Protection clause, as there was not a rational relation between the ordinance and legitimate state interests.
Carl Sandburg Village Condominium v. First Condominium Development: Federal Court Finds No Tying Arrangement Between Condominium Developer and Management Company
In Carl Sandburg Village Condominium Assciation No. 1 v. First Condominium Devel. Co., the Seventh Circuit addressed tying arrangements concerning the sale of condominiums and the use of a particular management company. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to show that the developers sold both the tied and tying product or service, and that no Sherman Antitrust Act violation had occurred.
In Award Realty v. Copeland, the Supreme Court of Tennessee addressed the issue of dual agency. Based upon the specific facts of the case, the court held that the broker acted only on behalf of the vendor and, as such, was entitled to a commission.
In People v. Natoinal Association of Realtors® (San Diego II), the California Court of Appeal held that the San Diego Board of REALTORS® created an illegal tying arrangement when it conditioned participation in its multiple listing service on Board membership.
In U.S. v. Graham Mortgage Corp., a 1984 case, the Sixth Circuit addressed alleged violations of 12 U.S.C. section 2607(a) (section 8(a) of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 (RESPA)). The court reversed the criminal conviction of the appellants, as it found that the plain language and legislative history of RESPA did not indicate an intent to include the making of a mortgage loan within the definition of "settlement services."